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A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules

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  • J. Arin
  • E. Inarra
  • P. Luquin

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  • J. Arin & E. Inarra & P. Luquin, 2009. "A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(4), pages 361-376, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:4:p:361-376
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0094-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997. "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, January.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-635, May.
    3. Potters, Jos & Sudholter, Peter, 1999. "Airport problems and consistent allocation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 83-102, July.
    4. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    5. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
    6. William Thomson, 2007. "Cost allocation and airport problems," RCER Working Papers 537, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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    Cited by:

    1. Fielbaum, Andres & Kucharski, Rafał & Cats, Oded & Alonso-Mora, Javier, 2022. "How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? aligning system’s optimum with users’ equilibrium," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 301(3), pages 956-973.
    2. Elena Iñarra & Roberto Serrano & Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 2020. "The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 71(2), pages 225-266.
    3. Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2018. "A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 82-98.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Airport games; Egalitarian allocation; Nucleolus; Nash outcomes; C71; C72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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