DEHEZ, Pierre (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)) TELLONE, Daniela (CEREC, FacultŽs Universitaires Saint-Louis)
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A group of agents considers collaborating on a project which requires putting together elements owned by some of them. These elements are pure public goods with exclusion i.e. nonrival but excludable goods like for instance knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. The present paper addresses the question of how should agents be compensated for the goods they own. It is shown that this problem can be framed as a cost sharing game Ð called "data game" Ð to which standard cost sharing rules like the Shapley value or the nucleolus can then be applied and compared.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
2008010.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Value Theory M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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