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The EU legislation game: the case of asylum law

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  • Jenny Monheim-Helstroffer
  • Marie Obidzinski

Abstract

The newly introduced codecision procedure in asylum lawmaking at the EU level is analyzed through the lens of bargaining theory. We find a substantial institutional status quo bias, which can contribute to explain the current delays in asylum lawmaking. When a policy is agreed on, codecision increases the European Parliament’s influence, although the bargaining outcome is biased towards the Council of Ministers. It can nonetheless improve asylum seekers’ welfare. The Commission detains an agenda setting power.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2011-16.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-16

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Keywords: Asylum policy; Public choice; Codecision; EU institutions; Human rights.;

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  1. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, 08.
  2. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2002. "Preponderance of Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 725, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Pierre Dehez, 2011. "Allocation Of Fixed Costs: Characterization Of The (Dual) Weighted Shapley Value," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(02), pages 141-157.
  4. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
  5. Thierry Burger-Helmchen & Laurence Frank, 2011. "La création de rentes : une approche par les compétences et capacités dynamiques," Innovations, De Boeck Université, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 89-111.
  6. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
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