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The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements

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  • Pierre Dehez
  • Sophie Poukens

Abstract

We consider the problem of specifying Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory agreements faced by standard-setting organizations. Along with Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2007), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents to be weak in the sense that they have substitutes. Assuming that a value has been assigned to weak patents, we obtain a formula for the Shapley value that gives an insight into what FRAND agreements should look like.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2013-03.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2013-03

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Keywords: patent licensing; Shapley value; core.;

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  1. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt8vg425vj, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. A. Jorge Padilla & Anne Layne-Farrar & Richard Schmalensee, 2007. "Pricing Patents For Licensing In Standard Setting Organizations: Making Sense Of Frand Commitments," Working Papers wp2007_0702, CEMFI.
  3. Duranton, Gilles & Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Mayneris, Florian, 2010. "The Economics of Clusters: Lessons from the French Experience," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199592203.
  4. Fleurbaey,Marc & Maniquet,François, 2011. "A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521715348, November.
  5. Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August.
  6. DEHEZ, Pierre & TELLONE, Daniela, 2008. "Data games. Sharing public goods with exclusion," CORE Discussion Papers 2008010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole & Marcin Strojwas, 2003. "Cooperative Marketing Agreements Between Competitors: Evidence from Patent Pools," NBER Working Papers 9680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. CARPANTIER, Jean-François & SAPATA, Christelle, 2012. "Unfair inequalities in France: A regional comparison," CORE Discussion Papers 2012038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Muto, S. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1989. "Information market games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154244, Tilburg University.
  10. WAN, Shui-Ki & WANG, Shin-Huei & WOO, Chi-Keung, 2012. "Total tourist arrival forecast: aggregation vs. disaggregation," CORE Discussion Papers 2012039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Muto, Shigeo & Potters, Jos & Tijs, Stef, 1989. "Information Market Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 209-26.
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