The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements
AbstractWe consider the problem of specifying Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory agreements faced by standard-setting organizations. Along with Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee (2007), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents to be weak in the sense that they have substitutes. Assuming that a value has been assigned to weak patents, we obtain a formula for the Shapley value that gives an insight into what FRAND agreements should look like.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2013012.
Date of creation: 06 May 2013
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patent licensing; Shapley value; core;
Other versions of this item:
- Pierre Dehez & Sophie Poukens, 2013. "The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements," Working Papers of BETA 2013-03, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-06-04 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2013-06-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-INO-2013-06-04 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2013-06-04 (Intellectual Property Rights)
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