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Cost allocation and airport problems

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Abstract

We consider the problem of dividing the cost of a facility when agents can be ordered in terms of the need they have for it, and accommodating an agent with a certain need allows accommodating all agents with lower needs at no extra cost. This problem is known as the “airport problem”, the facility being the runway. We review the literature devoted to its study, and formulate a number of open questions.

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File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_537.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 537.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:537

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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: airport problem; monotonicity; consistency; core; Shapley value; nucleolus.;

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Cited by:
  1. Grahn-Voorneveld, Sofia, 2011. "Sharing costs in Swedish road ownership associations," Working papers in Transport Economics 2011:6, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
  2. J. Arin & E. Inarra & P. Luquin, 2009. "A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 361-376, December.
  3. Youngsub Chun & Boram Park, 2012. "Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 255-270, May.
  4. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., . "A new analysis of a simple model of fair allocation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2471, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Takayuki Oishi & Shin Sakaue, 2014. "A Microeconomic Analysis toward Building Liability Lawin the Post-Earthquake Era," KIER Working Papers 890, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Dong, Baomin & Guo, Guixia & Wang, Yuntong, 2012. "Highway toll pricing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(3), pages 744-751.
  7. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2013. "Cost Sharing in Chains and Other Fixed Trees," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 12/2013, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
  8. DEHEZ, Pierre & FEREY, Samuel, 2012. "How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach," CORE Discussion Papers 2012023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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