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Executive Compensation: Facts

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  • Gian Luca Clementi
  • Thomas Cooley

Abstract

In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Notable facts are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of security grants has increased over time; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way.

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File URL: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~gclement/Papers/facts.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 09-16.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:09-16

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Postal: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, 44 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012-1126
Phone: (212) 998-0860
Fax: (212) 995-4218
Web page: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/
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References

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  1. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August.
  2. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
  3. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2006. "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," NBER Working Papers 12365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Chen Wang, 2004. "Stock Grants as a Committment Device," Working Papers 04-24, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. Peter F. Kostiuk, 1990. "Firm Size and Executive Compensation," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(1), pages 90-105.
  6. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, 2005. "The Growth of Executive Pay," NBER Working Papers 11443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Gerald Garvey & Todd Milbourn, 2003. "Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1557-1582, 08.
  8. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Cheng Wang, . "Stock Grants as Commitment Device," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  9. Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 72-105, September.
  10. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3277, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Scott Schaefer, 1998. "The Dependence Of Pay--Performance Sensitivity On The Size Of The Firm," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(3), pages 436-443, August.
  12. Cichello, Michael S., 2005. "The impact of firm size on pay-performance sensitivities," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 609-627, September.
  13. Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Staff General Research Papers 5170, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Helmut Dietl & Tobias Duschl & Markus Lang, 2011. "Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues," Working Papers 1106, International Association of Sports Economists & North American Association of Sports Economists, revised Mar 2011.
  2. Thomas Cooley & Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2013. "Risky Investments with Limited Commitment," Working Papers 13-17, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  3. Andreas Kuhn, 2010. "The Public Perception and Normative Valuation of Executive Compensation: An International Comparison," NRN working papers 2010-13, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  4. Riachi, Ilham & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2013. "Securitization of corporate assets and executive compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 235-251.
  5. Acrey, James Cash & McCumber, William R. & Nguyen, Thu Hien T., 2011. "CEO incentives and bank risk," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 456-471, September.

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