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Firm Size and Executive Compensation

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  • Peter F. Kostiuk
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    Abstract

    Using several data sets, the relationship between executive income and firm size is shown to be relatively stable over time and in different countries. The elasticity of executive earnings to firm size is about the same today as it was in the 1930s, with evidence of a decline in the earnings of top executives, controlling for firm size. In addition to the effects of size and other firm and industry characteristics, there are returns to age and experience. There is also substantial variability in the level of compensation among firms of comparable size, indicating that there may be impediments to mobility.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.

    Volume (Year): 25 (1990)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 90-105

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    Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:25:y:1990:i:1:p:90-105

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    Web page: http://jhr.uwpress.org/

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    Cited by:
    1. Humphery-Jenner, Mark L., 2012. "Internal and external discipline following securities class actions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 151-179.
    2. Yusuf Mohammed Nulla & Dimitris Nikolaou Koumparoulis, 2013. "CEO Compensation System in Large Canadian Financial Institutions," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(1), pages 137-155.
    3. Xavier Gabaix, 2009. "Power Laws in Economics and Finance," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 255-294, 05.
    4. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley, 2009. "Executive Compensation: Facts," NBER Working Papers 15426, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2006. "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," NBER Working Papers 12365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1740-69, December.
    7. Graßhoff, Ulrike & Schwalbach, Joachim, 1997. "Corporate restructuring, downsizing and managerial compensation," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1998,35, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    8. Kenneth W Clements & Izan H Y Izan, 2007. "The Stairway to the Top: The Remuneration of Academic Executives," Economics Discussion / Working Papers, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics 07-14, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    9. Shams, Syed M.M. & Gunasekarage, Abeyratna & Colombage, Sisira R.N., 2013. "Does the organisational form of the target influence market reaction to acquisition announcements? Australian evidence," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 89-108.
    10. repec:fth:prinin:426 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Xu, Peng, 1997. "Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as Managerial Incentives in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 319-346, September.
    12. Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, 2001. "The Gender gap in top corporate jobs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 55(1), pages 3-21, October.
    13. Ana P. Fernandes & Priscila Ferreira & L. Alan Winters, 2014. "The Effect of Competition on Managers' Compensation: Evidence From a Quasi-natural Experiment," NIMA Working Papers, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho 57, Núcleo de Investigação em Microeconomia Aplicada (NIMA), Universidade do Minho.
    14. Randy Silvers & Raul Susmel, 2014. "Compensation of a Manager: The Case of Major League Baseball," Economics Series 2014_4, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
    15. Tom Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale & Gian Luca Clementi, 2008. "Total Executive Compensation," 2008 Meeting Papers 906, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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