Firm Size and Executive Compensation
AbstractUsing several data sets, the relationship between executive income and firm size is shown to be relatively stable over time and in different countries. The elasticity of executive earnings to firm size is about the same today as it was in the 1930s, with evidence of a decline in the earnings of top executives, controlling for firm size. In addition to the effects of size and other firm and industry characteristics, there are returns to age and experience. There is also substantial variability in the level of compensation among firms of comparable size, indicating that there may be impediments to mobility.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.
Volume (Year): 25 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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