Total Executive Compensation
Abstractcontract. We focus our attention on testable implications: (i) the relationship between compensation and firm size, (ii) the relative importance of current and deferred compensation, (iii) the sensitivity of compensation to innovations in shareholder wealth, and (iv) the relationship between such sensitivity and size. Very preliminary results show that when the marginal product of managerial effort is increasing in capital, our model is consistent with facts (i), (iii), and (iv).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2008 Meeting Papers with number 906.
Date of creation: 2008
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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