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The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior

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Author Info
Karine Nyborg and Mari Rege () (Statistics Norway)

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Abstract

This paper studies the formation of social norms for considerate smoking behavior. Being considerate gives smokers a higher social approval from non-smokers, but imposes an inconvenience cost. A non-smoker's disapproval of inconsiderate smoking is assumed to be stronger the less used he is to being exposed to passive smoking. The analysis shows that introduction of a smoking regulation may move the society from an initial no-consideration Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in which every smoker is considerate, even in the unregulated zone. This crowding in of considerate behavior will prevail even after policy reversal. Empirical evidence confirms that a shift in social norms on considerate smoking has taken place in Norway after the smoking law amendments in 1988, and supports the plausibility of model assumptions.

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Paper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 279.

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Date of creation: Jul 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:279

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Related research
Keywords: Passive smoking; regulation; social norms; evolutionary game theory.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lindbeck, Assar, 1997. "Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 370-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. William N. Evans & Matthew C. Farrelly & Edward Montgomery, 1999. "Do Workplace Smoking Bans Reduce Smoking?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 728-747, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 1999. "Collective action as a social exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 341-369, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kjell Arne Brekke, Snorre Kverndokk and Karine Nyborg, 2000. "An Economic Model of Moral Motivation," Discussion Papers 290, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Nyborg, Karine & Howarth, Richard B. & Brekke, Kjell Arne, 2003. "Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation," Memorandum 31/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hammar, Henrik & Martinsson, Peter, 2001. "The Effect Of Cigarette Prices And Antismoking Policies On The Age Of Smoking Initiation," Working Papers in Economics 62, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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