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Towards a Behavioral Public Choice: Guilt-Aversion and Accountability in the Lab Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Luca Corazzini, Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal (ISLA, Universita' Bocconi, Milano )
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Mimicking standard features of electoral accountability and selection models, we conduct a computerized laboratory experiment in order to identify the influence of other-regarding preferences on democratic outcomes. We find that elected candidates are more pro-social towards their constituency the more favorable approval rates are. In contrast, this systematic positive relationship is not observed if the appointment is unintentionally determined by computer. These results suggest that a substantial fraction of candidates is motivated by guilt aversion. We discuss the implications of these findings for the design of democratic institutions.
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Paper provided by ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy in its series ISLA Working Papers with number
27.
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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:slp:islawp:islawp27Contact details of provider: Postal: via Sarfatti, 25 - 20136 Milano - Italy Phone: +39.025836.2296 Fax: +39.025836.5439 Web page: http://www.isla.unibocconi.it/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Stefano Riela).
Keywords: guilt aversion social preferences accountability constitutional design public choice experiment. Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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