This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

How Trade Politics Affect Invasive Species Control

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Margolis, Michael
Shogren, Jason

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff. In this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified, using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into Grossman and Helpman’s well-known political economy model. We show our measure of disguised protectionism—the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game—is equal to the tariff that would be set if there were no invasive species and no international disciplines on trade policy. The informational needs required to distinguish disguised protectionism from legitimate public-goods protection are formidable.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-04-07.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-04-07.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 11 Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-04-07

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rff.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Webmaster).

Related research
Keywords: invasive species protectionism tariff political economy

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade
Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounting
Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Gawande, Kishore, 1997. "US non-tariff barriers as privately provided public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-81, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoglu, 2002. ""Protection For Sale" In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 497-508, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Anh Tu & John C. Beghin & Estelle Gozlan, 2005. "Tariff Escalation and Invasive Species Risk," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp407, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kimberly Burnett & Sean D’Evelyn & Brooks Kaiser & Porntawee Nantamanasikarn & James Roumasset, 2007. "Beyond the Lamppost: Optimal Prevention and Control of the Brown Treesnake in Hawaii," Working Papers 200714, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.