Forest Conservation - Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model
AbstractThis paper studies the formation of forest conservation policy when the government is influenced by an environmental lobby and an industrial lobby representing a non-competitive forest industry. Lobbying is modelled as a common agency game which is extended to allow for asymmetries in lobbying technologies. When the forest product is exported the politically determined conservation policy always departs from the socially optimal policy in favor of the more efficient lobby. But when the forest product is destined for domestic markets conservation may ve excessive from the social point of view even though the industrial lobby has more efficient lobbying technology than the environmental lobby.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics in its series University of Helsinki, Department of Economics with number 491.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: University of Helsinki; Department of Economics, P.O.Box 54 (Unioninkatu 37) FIN-00014 Helsingin Yliopisto
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FOREST POLICY ; GOVERNMENT ; ENVIRONMENT;
Other versions of this item:
- Essi Eerola, 2004. "Forest Conservation – Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(4), pages 391-407, April.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
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