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Green and Producer Lobbies: Enemies or Allies?

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  • Conconi, P.

Abstract

In this paper we employ a common agency model to study the role of green and producer lobbies in the determination of trade and environmental policies. We focus on two large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution externalities. We show that the nature of the relationship between lobbies and the relative efficiency of unilateral and cooperative policy outcomes depend crucially on three factors: the type of policy regime, whether governments act unilaterally or cooperatively, and the extend of the 'pollution leakages'.

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File URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp570.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 570.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:570

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Keywords: POLLUTION ; INTERNATIONAL TRADE ; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY;

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References

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  1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
  2. Bernstein, Paul M. & Montgomery, W. David & Rutherford, Thomas F., 1999. "Global impacts of the Kyoto agreement: results from the MS-MRT model," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 375-413, August.
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  7. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
  8. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
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  10. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
  11. Rama, Martin & Tabellim, Guido, 1998. "Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1295-1316, July.
  12. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
  13. Jaime MELO DE & Olivier CADOT & OLARREAGA, 1996. "Lobbying and the Structure of Protection," Working Papers 199634, CERDI.
  14. Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
  15. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Per G. Fredriksson, 1999. "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 513-535, January.
  17. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
  18. Markusen, James R., 1975. "International externalities and optimal tax structures," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 15-29, February.
  19. Conconi, P., 2000. "Can Green Lobbies Replace a World Environmental Organization," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 548, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  20. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
  21. Copeland, Brian R & Taylor, M Scott, 1995. "Trade and Transboundary Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 716-37, September.
  22. Carlo Perroni & Randall M. Wigle, 1994. "International Trade and Environmental Quality: How Important Are the Linkages?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 551-67, August.
  23. Schleich, Joachim, 1999. "Environmental quality with endogenous domestic and trade policies1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 53-71, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Fredriksson, Per G. & Neumayer, Eric & Damania, Richard & Gates, Scott, 2005. "Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 343-365, March.
  2. Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "Political-support lobbies responses to international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) j05053, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

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