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On the First-Order Approach in Principal-Agent Models with Hidden Borrowing and Lending

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  • Sebastian Koehne

    (University of Mannheim)

  • Nicola Pavoni

    (University College London)

  • Arpad Abraham

    (EUI Florence)

Abstract

is monotone in output. We also investigate a few possibilities of relaxing these requirements.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2010 Meeting Papers with number 947.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:947

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References

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  1. In-Uck Park, 2004. "Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 701-746, 05.
  2. Mitchell, Matthew & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2010. "Unemployment insurance with hidden savings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2078-2107, November.
  3. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Macho, Ines & Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1994. "Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 1527-1553, October.
  4. Andrew Atkeson, 2010. "International lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 200, David K. Levine.
  5. University of Venice & Nicola Pavoni & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Ramsey Asset Taxation under Asymmetric Information," 2008 Meeting Papers 309, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Allen, Franklin, 1985. "Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 27-31.
  7. Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 781-803, October.
  8. John R. Conlon, 2009. "Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 249-278, 01.
  9. Abraham, Arpad & Pavoni, Nicola, 2004. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending," Working Papers 04-05, Duke University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Arpad Abraham & Nicola Pavoni, 2008. "Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: A Recursive Formulation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 781-803, October.
  2. Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2013. "Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy," IZA Discussion Papers 7806, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Tomasz Sadzik & Yuliy Sannikov, 2009. "Dynamic Incentive Accounts," NBER Working Papers 15324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2012. "The First-Order Approach when the Cost of Effort is Money," Cahiers de recherche 1220, CIRPEE.
  5. Mele, Antonio, 2014. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
  6. Abraham, Arpad & Koehne, Sebastian & Pavoni, Nicola, 2012. "Optimal income taxation with asset accumulation," MPRA Paper 38629, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2010. "Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions," IZA Discussion Papers 5201, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Árpád Ábrahám & Sarolta Laczó, 2013. "Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Storage," Working Papers 697, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  9. Sarolta Laczo & Arpad Abraham, 2012. "Efficient Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment and Hidden Saving," 2012 Meeting Papers 680, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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