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Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring

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  • Piero Gottardi

    ()
    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Venezia)

  • Alberto Bisin

    (Department of Economics, New York University)

  • Adriano Rampini

    (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)

Abstract

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his compensation using financial markets and shareholders can monitor the manager’s portfolio in order to keep him from hedging, but monitoring is costly. We find that the optimal incentive compensation and governance provisions have the following properties: (i) the manager’s portfolio is monitored only when the firm performs poorly, (ii) the manager’s compensation is more sensitive to firm performance when the cost of monitoring is higher or when hedging markets are more developed, and (iii) conditional on the firm’s performance, the manager’s compensation is lower when his portfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring. Moreover, the model suggests that the optimal level of portfolio monitoring is higher for managers of firms whose performance can be hedged more easily, such as larger firms and firms in more developed financial markets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 2007_24.

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Length: 20
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2007_24

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Keywords: Executive Compensation; Incentives; Monitoring; Corporate Governance;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Guido Ruta & Piero Gottardi, 2009. "Equilibrium corporate finance," 2009 Meeting Papers 149, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Papa, Gianluca & Speciale, Biagio, 2011. "Financial leverage and managerial compensation: Evidence from the UK," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 36-46, March.
  3. Luigi Iovino, 2012. "Sophisticated Intermediation and Aggregate Volatility," 2012 Meeting Papers 965, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Martine Quinzii & Michael Magill, 1900. "Normative Properties Of Stock Market Equilibrium With Moral Hazard," Working Papers 82, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  5. Gao, Huasheng, 2010. "Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 218-238, August.
  6. Avdjiev, Stefan & Zeng, Zheng, 2009. "Impact of heterogeneous managerial productivity on executive hedge markets in an asymmetric information environment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 187-201, December.
  7. Reich, S., 2007. "Robust Incentives," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0729, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  8. Bisin, Alberto & Guaitoli, Danilo, 2012. "Information extraction and norms of mutual protection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 154-162.

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