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Ramsey Asset Taxation under Asymmetric Information

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Author Info

  • University of Venice
  • Nicola Pavoni
  • Piero Gottardi

Abstract

3.Finally we consider the case where the government's information is even more limited, as not only the linear taxes on trades but also the lump-sum tax cannot depend on the ex-post realization of the individual income shocks. In this case the second best cannot typically be attained, but we show that still some partial insurance and some effort level (higher than the minimum) can be sustained, unlike what happens at the competitive equilibrium with no taxes or with only taxes and no trades in he market. Thus the interaction between markets and government intervention proves to be beneficial and enhances the efficiency properties of allocations. Also, at the optimum there may be nonzero trade in assets and in that case the expected tax rate is positive.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2008 Meeting Papers with number 309.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:309

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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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Cited by:
  1. Bertola, Giuseppe & Koeniger, Winfried, 2010. "Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8062, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Sebastian Koehne & Nicola Pavoni & Arpad Abraham, 2010. "On the First-Order Approach in Principal-Agent Models with Hidden Borrowing and Lending," 2010 Meeting Papers 947, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Abraham, Arpad & Koehne, Sebastian & Pavoni, Nicola, 2012. "Optimal income taxation with asset accumulation," MPRA Paper 38629, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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