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Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing

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Author Info
Allen, Franklin

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-45BC766-3P/2/9e36cb4e831e7f2a0cf74a1faab89132
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 17 (1985)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
Pages: 27-31
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:17:y:1985:i:1-2:p:27-31

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