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‘Make-or-Buy’ in International Oligopoly and the Role of Competitive Pressure

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  • Dermot, Leahy
  • Catia, Montagna

Abstract

We study how competitive pressure influences the make-or-buy decision that oligopolistic firms face between producing an intermediate component in-house or purchasing it from a domestic supplier. We model outsourcing as a bilateral relationship in which the supplier undertakes relationship specific investments. A home and foreign firm compete in the home market. Firms’ mode of operation decision depends on cost and strategic considerations. Competitive pressure increases firms’ incentive to outsource. Consumer gains from trade liberalisation are enhanced when it leads to less outsourcing.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 7468.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7468

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Keywords: Outsourcing; Vertical Integration; Trade Liberalisation; Oligopoly;

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  1. McLaren, John, 1999. "Supplier relations and the market context: A theory of handshakes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 121-138, June.
  2. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Integration Versus Outsourcing In Industry Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 85-120, February.
  3. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Gorzig, Bernd & Andreas Stephan, 2003. "Outsourcing and Firm-level Performance," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 90, Royal Economic Society.
  5. Nickerson, Jack A. & Vanden Bergh, Richard, 1999. "Economizing in a context of strategizing: governance mode choice in Cournot competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-15, September.
  6. Bartel, Ann P & Lach, Saul & Sicherman, Nachum, 2005. "Outsourcing and Technological Change," CEPR Discussion Papers 5082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, 2004. "The Muddles over Outsourcing," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 93-114, Fall.
  8. Jose Campa & Linda S. Goldberg, 1997. "The Evolving External Orientation of Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from Four Countries," NBER Working Papers 5919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Abraham, Katharine G & Taylor, Susan K, 1996. "Firms' Use of Outside Contractors: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 394-424, July.
  10. Chen, Yongmin & Ishikawa, Jota & Yu, Zhihao, 2004. "Trade liberalization and strategic outsourcing," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 419-436, July.
  11. Barbara J. Spencer, 2005. "International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 11418, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
  13. Holger Görg & Aoife Hanley, 2004. "Does Outsourcing Increase Profitability?," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 35(3), pages 267-288.
  14. Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2003. "Strategic outsourcing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 203-224, February.
  15. Spencer, Barbara J & Qiu, Larry D, 2001. "Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier to Trade?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 871-901, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Holger Görg & Aoife Hanley, 2008. "Services Outsourcing and Innovation: An empirical investigation," Kiel Working Papers 1417, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  2. Eckhardt Bode & Franz-Josef Bade Bade & Eleonora Cutrini Cutrini, 2011. "Domestic and International Offshoring of Tasks," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1840, European Regional Science Association.
  3. Dermot Leahy & Catia Montagna, 2010. "Strategic Investment And International Outsourcing In Unionised Oligopoly," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 231, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
  4. Leahy, Dermot & Montagna, Catia, 2008. "Outsourcing versus FDI in oligopoly equilibrium," SIRE Discussion Papers 2008-39, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  5. Franz-Josef Bade & Eckhardt Bode & Eleonora Cutrini, 2012. "Spatial fragmentation of industries by functions," Working Papers 39-2012, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Feb 2012.

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