This paper develops a model of informal procurement within Japanese keiretsu so as to consider effects on intermediate-good imports, such as auto parts. Parts-suppliers make relationship-specific investments that benefit the auto-maker and prices are determined by bargaining after investment has been sunk. Although this investment raises efficiency, it limits the range of imports to less important parts such as tail pipes and it is possible that no parts are imported, despite lower foreign production costs. Lack of information concerning investment rents combined with counterintuitive effects on imports and Japanese production costs could create unwarranted perceptions of a trade barrier.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
7572.
Length: Date of creation: Feb 2000 Date of revision: Publication status: published as Spencer, Barbara J. and Larry D. Qiu. "Keiretsu And Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier To Trade?," International Economic Review, 2001, v42(4,Nov), 871-901. Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7572
Note: ITI Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Find related papers by JEL classification: F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Krishna, K & Thursby, M & Roy, S, 1996.
"Implementing Market Access,"
Papers
96-011, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
Krishna, K & Roy, S & Thursby, M, 1996.
"Implementaing Market Access,"
Papers
96-003, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
Kala Krishna & Suddhasatwa Roy & Marie Thursby, 1996.
"Implementing Market Access,"
NBER Working Papers
5593, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)