We study the determinants of the extent of outsourcing and of direct foreign investment in an industry in which producers need specialized components. Potential suppliers must make a relationship-specific investment in order to serve each prospective customer. Such investments are governed by imperfect contracts. A final-good producer can manufacture components for itself, but the per-unit cost is higher than for specialized suppliers. We consider how the size of the cost differential, the extent of contractual incompleteness, the size of the industry, and the relative wage rate affect the organization of industry production.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
9300.
Length: Date of creation: Nov 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9300
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Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002.
"Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium,"
Working Papers
148, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
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Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 2002.
"Outsourcing in a Global Economy,"
Papers
218, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002.
"Outsourcing in a Global Economy,"
Working Papers
149, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
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Dalia Marin & Thierry Verdier, 2001.
"Power Inside the Firm and the Market: A General Equilibrium Approach,"
Discussion Papers
109, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, revised Apr 2006.
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