An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs
AbstractFor psychologists, bounded rationality reflects the presence of cognitive dissonance and/or inconsistency, revealing that people use heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) rather than sophisticated processes for the assessment of their beliefs. Recent research analyzing litigations and pretrial negotiations also focused on boundedly rational litigants (Bar-Gill (2005), Farmer and Peccorino (2002)) relying on a naïve modelling of the self-serving bias. Our paper in contrast introduces the case for disappointment averse litigants, relying on the axiomatic of Gull (1991). We show that this leads to a richer analysis in comparative statics; at the same time, this proves to be … disappointing: for the purposes of public policies in favour of the access to justice, recommendations are quite ambiguous.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 22291.
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
conflicts; litigation; negotiation; disappointment aversion.;
Other versions of this item:
- Eric Langlais, 2010. "An Analysis of Bounded Rationality in Judicial Litigations: The Case with Loss/Disappointment Averse Plaintiffs," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 41-50, June.
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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