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Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l’économie du risque

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Eric Langlais

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Abstract

Le droit du licenciement expose-t-il les entreprises françaises à un "risque judiciaire"? L’article discute les arguments des différentes thèses (Blanchard et Tirole (2003), Cahuc et Kramarz (2004), Munoz-Perez et Serverin (2005)) en interprétant les informations empiriques disponibles relatives aux décisions des salariés (acceptation/contestation) et des entreprises (choix du motif de licenciement) à partir des instruments de l’économie du risque. Nous montrons que l’analyse des données relatives aux recours devant les Prud’Hommes suggère de la part des salariés une attitude nettement moins riscophobe (voire clairement riscophile) que celle habituellement révélée sur les marchés du risque. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que le licenciement pour motif personnel n’apparait comme systématiquement préférable au motif économique que dans la mesure où les entreprises sont supposées riscophobes. A l’inverse, la comparaison du coût anticipé d’un licenciement entre le motif économique et le motif personnel apparait très sensible aux hypothèses concernant l’ancienneté du salarié, le taux de rejet du salarié devant les Prud’Hommes, ou le coût indirect du licenciement.

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Paper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2008-31.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2008-31

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Related research
Keywords: licenciements; Prud’Hommes; risque judiciaire;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies
K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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  1. Ioana Marinescu, 2008. "Are Judges Sensitive to Economic Conditions? Evidence from UK Employment Tribunals," Working Papers 0802, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. " Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
  3. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1987. "Why Is There Disagreement in Bargaining?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 347-52, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kramarz, Francis & Michaud, Marie-Laure, 2004. "The Shape of Hiring and Separation Costs," IZA Discussion Papers 1170, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Tversky, Amos & Wakker, Peter, 1995. "Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1255-80, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Abowd, John M. & Kramarz, Francis, 2003. "The costs of hiring and separations," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 499-530, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2002. "Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 163-176, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ichino, Andrea & Polo, Michele & Rettore, Enrico, 2003. "Are judges biased by labor market conditions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 913-944, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 1994. "Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 273-281, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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