Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts
Abstract
A sample of almost 500 jury-eligible citizens considered a series of experimental situations involving accidents. The juror sample did not properly apply negligence rules, as their errors were particularly great for low-probability, large-loss cases. They also penalized corporations for undertaking corporate risk analyses that seek to trade off cost versus risk reduction benefits. Jurors' damages assessments were also more prone to error than were responses by a sample of state judges. Judges were less prone to erroneous risk beliefs and less subject to the zero-risk mentality. Copyright 2001 by the University of Chicago.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 107-42
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2008.
"Legal Interpretative Process and Litigants’ Cognitive Biases,"
MPRA Paper
14370, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Legal Interpretative Process and Litigants’Cognitive Biases," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-8, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Eric Langlais, 2008.
"Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse,"
Cahiers du CEREFIGE
0806, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite Nancy 2 - Metz, revised 2008.
- Langlais, Eric, 2008. "Cognitive dissonance, risk aversion and the pretrial negotiation impasse," MPRA Paper 8844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eric Langlais, 2008. "Asymmetric information, self-serving bias and the pretrial negotiation impasse," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-30, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Langlais, Eric, 2010.
"An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs,"
MPRA Paper
22291, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Eric Langlais, 2010. "An Analysis of Bounded Rationality in Judicial Litigations: The Case with Loss/Disappointment Averse Plaintiffs," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, Association for Sustainable Education, Research and Science, vol. 0(1), pages 41-50, June.
- Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2009.
"Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises,"
Cahiers du CEREFIGE
0901, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite Nancy 2 - Metz, revised 2009.
- Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-10, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprise," Working Papers of BETA 2009-28, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2009.
"Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises
[Strategic default and bankruptcy law]," MPRA Paper 14366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fredrik Carlsson & Dinky Daruvala & Henrik Jaldell, 2012.
"Do administrators have the same priorities for risk reductions as the general public?,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 79-95, August.
- Carlsson, Fredrik & Daruvala, Dinky & Jaldell, Henrik, 2013. "Do administrators have the same priorities for risk reductions as the general public?," Karlstad University Working Papers in Economics 7, Department of Economics, Karlstad University.
- Thomas A. Eaton & David B. Mustard & Susette M. Talarico, 2005. "Punitive Damages and the Processing of Tort Claims," Law and Economics 0501002, EconWPA.
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