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The role of authoritative media in Economics

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  • Bušs, Ginters

Abstract

The paper explores the link between authoritative media, which is called the public court in the paper, and economic prosperity. Three types of evidence are used. First, arguments of the superiority of the public court over traditional media are provided. Second, a formal model shows a causal effect from more authoritative media viewers to greater political efficiency. Finally, the paper presents an overview of empirical literature on the link between political efficiency and economic prosperity. The finding of the paper is that the public court facilitates economic prosperity regardless of whether the traditional media are politically biased or not.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17893/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17893.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17893

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Keywords: institutional economics; media; politics; public court; economic prosperity;

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  12. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
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  15. Snyder Jr., James M. & Ting, Michael M., 2008. "Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 482-500, April.
  16. Paolo Mauro, 1996. "The Effects of Corruptionon Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund 96/98, International Monetary Fund.
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  18. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Governance matters," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 2196, The World Bank.
  19. Keefer, Philip & Knack, Stephen, 1997. "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of Institutional Explanation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 590-602, July.
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