Fabrizio Carmignani (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe)
Abstract
In a simple theoretical framework, the quality of institutions affects individual’s investment decisions, and hence income levels and distribution. When institutions deteriorates and inequalities increase, the incumbent undertakes redistributive taxation to maintain political support. The quality of institutions and the extent of redistribution depend on the degree of government responsiveness to citizens and on the credibility of the political opposition to the incumbent. The econometric analysis is based on both single equation models and systems of equations. Good institutions are found to reduce the Gini coefficient and to increase average income, growth, and income of the poor. However, some non-linearites are detected in the institutions-Gini relationship.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number
0503007.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1998.
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NBER Working Papers
6727, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Neeman, Zvika & Paserman, Marco Daniele & Simhon, Avi, 2003.
"Corruption and Openness,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4057, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Zvika Neeman & M. Daniele Paserman & Avi Simhon, 2004.
"Corruption and Openness,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp353, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
[Downloadable!]
Neeman, Zvika & Paserman, Daniele & Simhon, Avi, 2003.
"Corruption And Openness,"
Discussion Papers
14977, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
[Downloadable!]
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