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Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model

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Author Info
Angeletos, George-Marios
Kollintzas, Tryphon

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking and corruption in the growth context. We develop an endogenous growth model where entrepreneurs, as intermediate-good producers, may engage in rent-seeking activities. The latter are defined by the following properties: (i) their internal effect is positive; (ii) their external effect is negative; and (iii) they use real resources. Our formulation may be viewed as a parable for theft and fraud; organized crime; industrial espionage; lobbying and policy influence; misgovernance, institutional inefficiency, tax evasion, etc. The economy is shown to fall into a trap of high rent seeking/corruption and low growth. Agents' perceptions about the external effects of rent seeking, and the complementarity or substitutability of intermediate inputs, are crucial. Contrary to conventional wisdom, higher returns to capital and more competition can be detrimental for welfare and growth, as they induce more rent seeking/corruption. Finally, our paradigm yields insights into the relationship of R&D, politicoeconomic equilibrium, income distribution, and growth, as well as the design of tax/growth policies in the presence of rent seeking/corruption.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2464.

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Date of creation: May 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2464

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Related research
Keywords: Corruption; Growth; Property Rights; Rent Seeking;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Gaitan, Beatriz & Pavel, Ferdinand, 2001. "How To Consider Governance In Economic Policy Modeling?," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20566, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2004. "Fairness and Redistribution," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000283, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alberto Alesina & George-Marios Angeletos, 2003. "Fairness and Redistribution: U.S. versus Europe," NBER Working Papers 9502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Charles Ka-Yui Leung & Sam Hak Kan Tang & Nicolaas Groenewold, 2005. "Growth volatility and technical progress: a simple rent-seeking model," Discussion Papers 00016, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2005. "Efficiency Of Institutions, Political Stability And Income Dynamics," Public Economics 0503007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Daniel Brou & Michele Ruta, 2007. "Rent Seeking, Market Structure and Growth," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/03, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
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