Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Limits to redistribution in a democracy: a survey

Contents:

Author Info

  • Harms, Philipp
  • Zink, Stefan

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V97-49P49F0-3/2/7e401208bbcef5ea21add6ea23f17bf9
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 651-668

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:4:p:651-668

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, . "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities," Working Papers 178, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  2. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did The West Extend The Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, And Growth In Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199, November.
  3. Friedrich Breyer & Heinrich Ursprung, 1998. "Are the rich too rich to be expropriated?: Economic power and the feasibility of constitutional limits to redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 135-156, January.
  4. Robert Haveman & Barbara Wolfe, 1995. "The Determinants of Children's Attainments: A Review of Methods and Findings," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 1829-1878, December.
  5. Piketty, Thomas, 1995. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 551-84, August.
  6. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May.
  7. Roemer, John E., 1998. "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 399-424, December.
  8. Dennis Epple & Michael Riordan, 1987. "Cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 41-73, September.
  9. Falkinger, Josef, 1999. "Social instability and redistribution of income," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 35-51, March.
  10. Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson, 1994. "On the political economy of education subsidies," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 185, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  11. Perotti, Roberto, 1993. "Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution, and Growth," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 755-76, October.
  12. Ermisch, John & Francesconi, Marco, 2001. "Family Matters: Impacts of Family Background on Educational Attainments," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 68(270), pages 137-56, May.
  13. Benabou, R. & Ok, E.A., 1998. "Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 98-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  14. CREMER, Helmuth & FOURGEAUD, Virginie & LEITE MONTEIRO, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice, 1995. "Mobility and Redistribution : A Survey," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1995066, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Corneo, Giacomo & Gruner, Hans Peter, 2002. "Individual preferences for political redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 83-107, January.
  16. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," NBER Working Papers 3460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Hettich, W. & Winter, S.L., 1993. "The Political Economy of Taxation," Papers, Carleton - Business Administration 93-2, Carleton - Business Administration.
  18. Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
  19. Hirschman, Albert O., 1973. "The changing tolerance for income inequality in the course of economic development," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(12), pages 29-36, December.
  20. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 1990. "Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 115-132, 07.
  21. Harms, Philipp & Zink, Stefan, 2003. " Eating the Rich vs. Feeding the Poor: Borrowing Constraints and the Reluctance to Redistribute," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 351-66, September.
  22. Hansen, Jorgen Drud, 2003. "Immigration and income redistribution in welfare states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 735-746, November.
  23. Epple, Dennis & Romer, Thomas, 1991. "Mobility and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 828-58, August.
  24. Roland Benabou, 2000. "Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 96-129, March.
  25. Ravallion, Martin & Lokshin, Michael, 2000. "Who wants to redistribute?: The tunnel effect in 1990s Russia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 87-104, April.
  26. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
  27. Topel, Robert, 1999. "Labor markets and economic growth," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 44, pages 2943-2984 Elsevier.
  28. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  29. Milanovic, Branko, 2000. "The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: an empirical test with the required data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 367-410, September.
  30. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  31. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
  32. Danziger, Leif & Ursprung, Heinrich W., 2001. "Risk aversion and social mobility: the implausibility of order-preserving income redistributions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 9-13, December.
  33. Grossman, Herschel I., 1995. "Robin hood and the redistribution of property income," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 399-410, September.
  34. Hans Peter Gruner & Giacomo Corneo, 2000. "Social Limits to Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1491-1507, December.
  35. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June.
  36. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-40, August.
  37. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
  38. Krusell, Per & Quadrini, Vincenzo & Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor, 1997. "Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 243-272, January.
  39. Artale, Angelo & Gruner, Hans Peter, 2000. "A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 20-40, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:4:p:651-668. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.