Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade
AbstractThis paper shows that if rationality is not common knowledge, the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) fails to hold. We adopt Monderer and Samet's (1990) notion of common p-belief and show that when traders entertain doubts about the rationality of other traders, and even if these doubts are very small, arbitrarily large volumes of trade as well as rationality may be common p-belief for a large p. Furthermore, rationality and trade may simultaneously be known to arbitrary large (but finite) degree. The underlying intuition of the model is that, in trade situation, every trader may be rational but may believe tht the others are not fully rational. Thus, rational traders trade with each other, believeing that the other trader might be wrong, while they are right.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1052.
Date of creation: May 1993
Date of revision:
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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Other versions of this item:
- Neeman, Zvika, 1996. "Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 77-96, September.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- D. Samet, 1987.
"Ignoring Ignorance and Agreeing to Disagree,"
749, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Zvika Neeman, 1993. "A Note on Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs," Discussion Papers 1029, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
- Angrisani Marco & Guarino Antonio & Huck Steffen & Larson Nathan C, 2011.
"No-Trade in the Laboratory,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-58, April.
- Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Steffen Huck & Nathan Larson, 2008. "No-Trade in the Laboratory," WEF Working Papers 0045, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
- Marco Angrisani & Antonio Guarino & Steffen Huck & Nathan Larson, 2008. "No-Trade in the Laboratory," CESifo Working Paper Series 2436, CESifo Group Munich.
- Robin Hanson, 2003. "For Bayesian Wannabes, Are Disagreements Not About Information?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 105-123, March.
- Barelli, Paulo, 2009. "Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 363-375, November.
- Luo, Xiao & Ma, Chenghu, 2003. ""Agreeing to disagree" type results: a decision-theoretic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 849-861, November.
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