Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief
AbstractWe characterize the class of n-person belief systems for which common belief has the properties of the strongest logic of belief, KD45. The characterizing condition states that individuals are not too mistaken in their beliefs about common beliefs. It is shown to be considerably weaker than the consistency condition on interpersonal beliefs implied by the common knowledge assumption: it allows individuals to ""agree to disagree"" and to be quite incorrect about others7 beliefs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Davis - Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics with number 95-08.
Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of California Davis - Department of Economics. One Shields Ave., California 95616-8578
Phone: (530) 752-0741
Fax: (530) 752-9382
Web page: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/
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Other versions of this item:
- Bonanno, G. & Nehring, K., 1995. "Intersubjective Consistency of Beliefs and the Logic of Common Belief," Papers 95-08, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2004. "Intersubjective Consistency Of Beliefs And The Logic Of Common Belief," Working Papers 958, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
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