IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cda/wpaper/144.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Intersubjective Consistency Of Beliefs And The Logic Of Common Belief

Author

Listed:
  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

We characterize the class of n-person belief systems for which common belief has the properties of the strongest logic of belief, KD45. The characterizing condition states that individuals are not too mistaken in their beliefs about common beliefs. It is shown to be considerably weaker than the consistency condition on interpersonal beliefs implied by the common knowledge assumption: it allows individuals to ""agree to disagree"" and to be quite incorrect about others7 beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno, 2004. "Intersubjective Consistency Of Beliefs And The Logic Of Common Belief," Working Papers 144, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:144
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/dQMsHg7Cf27VFf3vChPQ9NqZ/95-8.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. LISMONT, Luc & MONGIN, Philippe, 1994. "On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Milgrom, Paul, 1981. "An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 219-222, January.
    3. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "On the logic of "agreeing to disagree" type results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 184-193, June.
    4. Shin Hyun Song, 1993. "Logical Structure of Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-13, June.
    5. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
    6. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
    7. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Common knowledge with probability 1," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 237-245, June.
    8. Samet, Dov, 1990. "Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 190-207, October.
    9. Bonanno, G., 1994. "The Logic of Shared Belief, Public Rumor, Public Shared Belief and Common Belief," Papers 94-10, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
    10. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bernard Walliser, 1991. "Logique épistémique et théorie des jeux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(5), pages 801-832.
    2. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    3. Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-36, January.
    4. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2019. "Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 73-82.
    5. Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Aggregate information, common knowledge, and agreeing not to bet," Working Papers in Economics 254, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    6. John Geanakoplos, 1993. "Common Knowledge," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1062, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2020. "Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 169-189.
    8. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Department of Economics 97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    9. Lismont L. & Mongin, P., 1996. "Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-60, February.
    10. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 1420-1454, November.
    11. Dominiak, Adam & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2015. "“Agreeing to disagree” type results under ambiguity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 119-129.
    12. Áron Tóbiás, 2023. "Cognitive limits and preferences for information," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 46(1), pages 221-253, June.
    13. Zimper, Alexander, 2009. "Half empty, half full and why we can agree to disagree forever," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 283-299, August.
    14. Khrennikov, Andrei, 2015. "Quantum version of Aumann’s approach to common knowledge: Sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 89-104.
    15. Shyam NMI Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm213, Yale School of Management.
    16. Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2013. "Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 129-133.
    17. , & ,, 2011. "Agreeing to agree," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    18. Matsuhisa, Takashi & Kamiyama, Kazuyoshi, 1997. "Lattice structure of knowledge and agreeing to disagree," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 389-410, May.
    19. Gossner, Olivier & Tsakas, Elias, 2007. "Testing Rationality on Primitive Knowledge," Working Papers in Economics 275, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    20. Oscar Volij, 2000. "Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 63-79.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Letters and Science IT Services Unit (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/educdus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.