Competitive and Harmonised R&D Policies for International R&D Alliances involving Asymmetric Firms
AbstractWe examine research and development (R&D) policies when a national firm forms an R&D alliance with a foreign competitor. Firms differ in their R&D capabilities, and adopt a profit-sharing rule when R&D decisions are coordinated. National R&D tax/subsidy policies are set independently or harmonised. When firms coodinate their R&D decisions and governments choose R&D policies independently, R&D taxes are chosen. But there is no intervention if policies are harmonised. These policy outcomes affect the types of R&D alliance choosen. Agreements to share R&D information may be preferred to those combining coordination of R&D decisions and information sharing because of the R&D tax that coordination attracts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Nottingham, GEP in its series Discussion Papers with number 12/03.
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R&D efficiency; asymmetric R&D alliance; cost-reducing R&D; R&D policy; cooperative R&D agreement.;
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