Political Market Structure
AbstractMany political markets are essentially uncontested, in the sense that one candidate raises little (or no) money and consequently has little chance of election. This presents a puzzle in the presence of apparently low barriers to entry. Using a variant of Baron (1989) we provide a theory encompassing both contested and uncontested markets. The essential addition is the presence of fixed costs of campaigning. We show that these may be quite small and yet constitute decisive barriers to entry.
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Date of creation: Jul 2001
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-07-13 (All new papers)
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