Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?
AbstractPolitical Action Committees (PACs) can affect public policies in either of two ways: altering legislators' roll-call voting behavior, or influencing election outcomes. This paper develops a dynamic model demonstrating that the relative importance of the election-influencing channel is easily underestimated. A one-time contribution to a candidate who supports the PAC's position that alters an election outcome yields benefits to the PAC as long as that candidate holds office. In contrast, roll-call vote buying is likely to operate on a quid-pro-quo basis, limiting the PAC's return on investment. Empirical tests based on the theoretical model suggest that PACs value the election-influencing aspect of contributions at least as much as the roll-call vote-buying channel. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economic and Politics.
Volume (Year): 10 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Revold Entov & Alexander Radygin, 2012. "Failures of the State: Theory and Policy," Working Papers 0053, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
- Paul Heaton, 2005. "Oil for What?—Illicit Iraqi Oil Contracts and the U.N. Security Council," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 193-206, Fall.
- James E. Anderson & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Political Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.