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Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence From the States

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Author Info
Jeffrey Milyo () (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia)
David M. Primo

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Abstract

The decline of political efficacy and trust in the United States is often linked to the rise of money in politics. Both the courts and reform advocates justify restrictions on campaign donations and spending as necessary for the improvement of links between the government and the governed. We conduct the first test of whether campaign finance laws actually influence how citizens view their government by exploiting the variation in campaign finance regulations both across and within states during the last half of the 20th century. Our analysis reveals no large positive effects of campaign finance laws on political efficacy. Public disclosure laws and limits on contributions from organizations are in some cases associated with modest increases in efficacy, but public financing is associated with a similarly modest decrease in efficacy.

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File URL: http://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2005/wp0513_milyo.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 0513.

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Length: 36 pgs.
Date of creation: 25 Aug 2005
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Publication status: forthcoming in Election Law Journal
Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0513

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Related research
Keywords: Campaign finance; trust; social capital;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  3. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John M. de Figueiredo & Charles M. Cameron, 2006. "Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-156, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  2. John M. de Figueriedo, 2004. "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," NBER Working Papers 10588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. John de Figueiredo, . "The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1082, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
  4. David Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "State Campaign Finance Laws and the Turnout Decision," Working Papers 0410, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-11.


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