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The Timing, Intensity, and Composition of Interest Group Lobbying: An Analysis of Structural Policy Windows in the States

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John de Figueiredo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
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Paper provided by American Law & Economics Association in its series American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings with number 1082.

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  1. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Jeffrey Milyo & David M. Primo, 2005. "Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence From the States," Working Papers 0513, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
  3. McKelvey, Richard D. & Riezman, Raymond., 1990. "Seniority in Legislatures," Working Papers 725, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  4. A. Muthoo & K. A. Shepsle, 2003. "Agenda Setting Power in Organizations With Overlapping Generations of Players," Economics Discussion Papers 553, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Brinig, Margaret F & Holcombe, Randall G & Schwartzstein, Linda, 1993. " The Regulation of Lobbyists," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 377-84, October.
  7. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
  9. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., 2003. "Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Lowery, David & Gray, Virginia, 1997. " How Some Rules Just Don't Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 139-47, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.


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