Nonmarket performance: Evidence from U.S. electric utilities
AbstractBuilding on a framework that assesses the attractiveness of ‘political markets’ – where firms transact over public policies with government policy-makers – we develop hypotheses regarding the success or performance of firms’ nonmarket strategies. We propose that the ability of firms to gain more favorable policy outcomes is increasing in the degree of rivalry among elected politicians; the firm’s recent experience with policy-makers; and the opportunity to learn from other firms’ recent experiences; and is decreasing in the degree of rivalry from competing interest groups and the resource base of regulatory agencies. Using data on regulatory filings for rate increases made by the population of U.S. privately-owned electric utilities over a 13 year period, we find empirical support for our arguments.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14437.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Nonmarket strategy; lobbying; Electric utilities;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Heckman, James, 2013.
"Sample selection bias as a specification error,"
Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
- McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
- Stephen Coate & Timothy Besley, 2000.
"Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
7579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2381, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Guy L. F. Holburn, 2004. "Influencing Agencies Through Pivotal Political Institutions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 458-483, October.
- David P. Baron, 2001. "Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 47-89, 03.
- Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
- Brian S. Silverman, 1999. "Technological Resources and the Direction of Corporate Diversification: Toward an Integration of the Resource-Based View and Transaction Cost Economics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(8), pages 1109-1124, August.
- North, D.C., 1990.
"A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics,"
144, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
- Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
- Dolton, P. J. & Makepeace, G. H., 1987. "Interpreting sample selection effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 373-379.
- John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002.
"Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying,"
NBER Working Papers
9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Henderson, Rebecca. & Cockburn, Iain., 1994. "Measuring competence? : exploring firm effects in pharmaceutical research," Working papers 3712-94., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Bonardi, Jean-Philippe & Urbiztondo, Santiago & Quelin, Bertrand, 2008.
"The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities,"
14435, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jean-Philippe Bonardi & Santiago Urbiztondo & Bertrand V. Quelin, 2009. "The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(2), pages 232-256.
- Kim, Jin-Hyuk, 2008.
"Corporate Lobbying Revisited,"
51396, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- M. Maegli & C. Jaag & M. Finger, 2010.
"Regulatory Governance Costs in Network Industries: Observations in Postal Regulation,"
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries,
Intersentia, vol. 11(2), pages 207-238, June.
- Martin Maegli & Christian Jaag & Matthias Finger, 2010. "Regulatory Governance Costs in Network Industries: Observations in Postal Regulation," Working Papers 0018, Swiss Economics.
- Bonardi, Jean-Philippe, 2008. "The internal limits to firms' nonmarket activities," MPRA Paper 14500, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Maegli, Martin & Jaag, Christian, 2009. "Regulatory Governance Costs in Network Industries: Implicatins for postal Regulation," MPRA Paper 15309, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jeffrey Macher & John Mayo, 2012. "The World of Regulatory Influence," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 59-79, February.
- Ozer, Mine, 2010. "Top management teams and corporate political activity: Do top management teams have influence on corporate political activity?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(11), pages 1196-1201, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.