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Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority‐Rule and Executive Institutions

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  • David P. Baron

Abstract

This paper presents theories of strategic nonmarket participation in majority‐rule and executive institutions and develops from those theories a set of principles for nonmarket strategy. The theories are based on models of vote recruitment in client and interest‐group politics and on models of common agency. The basic strategies developed are majority building, vote recruitment, agenda setting, rent‐chain mobilization, majority protection, and competitive agenda setting and vote recruitment.

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  • David P. Baron, 2001. "Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority‐Rule and Executive Institutions," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 47-89, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:10:y:2001:i:1:p:47-89
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00047.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Groseclose, Tim, 1996. "An Examination of the Market for Favors and Votes in Congress," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(2), pages 320-340, April.
    2. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-294, March.
    3. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
    4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    6. Krehbiel, Keith, 1999. "Pivotal Politics: A Refinement of Nonmarket Analysis for Voting Institutions," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 63-81, April.
    7. Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Rent dissipation, free riding, and trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 795-803, April.
    8. Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December.
    9. David P. Baron, 1997. "Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak‐Fujifilm Case," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 291-346, June.
    10. Baron, David P., 1999. "Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and Interest Group Politics," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 7-34, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan P. Doh & Thomas Lawton & Tazeeb Rajwani, 2012. "Advancing Nonmarket Strategy Research : Institutional Perspectives in a Changing World," Post-Print hal-02276718, HAL.
    2. David P. Baron, 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 7-45, March.
    3. Bonardi, Jean-Philippe & Urbiztondo, Santiago, 2013. "Asset freezing, corporate political resources and the Tullock paradox," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 275-293, October.
    4. Magda M. Smink & Marko P. Hekkert & Simona O. Negro, 2015. "Keeping sustainable innovation on a leash? Exploring incumbents’ institutional strategies," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 86-101, February.
    5. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.
    6. Benjamin J. McMichael, 2017. "The Demand for Healthcare Regulation: The Effect of Political Spending on Occupational Licensing Laws," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(1), pages 297-316, July.
    7. Geir Asheim & Carl Claussen & Tore Nilssen, 2006. "Majority voting leads to unanimity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 91-110, December.
    8. Bonardi, Jean-Philippe & Holburn, Guy & Vanden Bergh, Rick, 2006. "Nonmarket performance: Evidence from U.S. electric utilities," MPRA Paper 14437, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Rui J. P. De Figueiredo & Geoff Edwards, 2007. "Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 547-576, September.
    10. Md. Tanveer Ahmed & Jun Zhuang & Changhyun Kwon, 2017. "Understanding Conflicting Interests of a Government and a Tobacco Manufacturer: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 26(6), pages 1209-1230, November.
    11. Gabriel Natividad, 2022. "Decentralizing investment: Evidence from municipal organization after close elections," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 734-761, August.

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