The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers
AbstractThis paper introduces a structural model of campaign finance which permits estimation of the marginal costs of raising money as well as the marginal benefits of spending and saving money. The model is estimated for the 1986 through 1990 election cycles; the results demonstrate that the probability of retirement hinders an incumbent's ability to raise money and that incumbents willingly trade off electoral security for financial gain. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 93 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Milyo, Jeffrey, 1997. " The Economics of Political Campaign Finance: FECA and the Puzzle of the Not Very Greedy Grandfathers," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 245-70, December.
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- Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April.
- Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2005. "Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 467-482, March.
- John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December.
- Jeffrey Milyo, 1998. "The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: A Natural Experiment Approach," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9806, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 461-474, December.
- James E. Anderson & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Political Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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