The Economics of Political Campaign Finance: FECA and the Puzzle of the Not Very Greedy Grandfathers
This paper introduces a structural model of campaign finance which permits estimation of the marginal costs of raising money as well as the marginal benefits of spending and saving money. The model is estimated for the 1986 through 1990 election cycles; the results demonstrate that the probability of retirement hinders an incumbent's ability to raise money and that incumbents willingly trade off electoral security for financial gain. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:93:y:1997:i:3-4:p:245-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.