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Political pressure deflection

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Author Info

  • JamesE. Anderson
  • Maurizio Zanardi

Abstract

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes-political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to 'sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution. © 2009 The Author(s).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/136351.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Publication status: Published in: Public choice (2009) v.141,p.129-150
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/136351

Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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Related research

Keywords: Pressure deflection; Elections; Antidumping; D72; F13; H11;

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References

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  1. Elhanan Helpman & Gene M. Grossman, 1999. "Competing for Endorsements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 501-524, June.
  2. James E. Anderson & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Political Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
  6. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  7. Cukierman, Alex & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "The Politics of Ambiguity," Scholarly Articles 4552530, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  9. Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-66, June.
  10. Anderson, James E., 1993. "Domino dumping II: Anti-dumping," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 133-150, August.
  11. Enriqueta Aragones & Zvika Neeman, 1994. "Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1083, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
  13. Gallaway, Michael P. & Blonigen, Bruce A. & Flynn, Joseph E., 1999. "Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-244, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
  2. Conconi, Paola & Perroni, Carlo, 2009. "Do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 160-170, September.
  3. Tobias D. Ketterer, 2014. "EU Antidumping and Tariff Cuts: Trade Policy Substitution?," Discussion Papers 2014-05, University of Nottingham, GEP.

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