Locked Up by a Lockup: Valuing Liquidity as a Real Option
AbstractHedge funds often impose lockups and notice periods to limit the ability of investors to withdraw capital. We model the investor’s decision to withdraw capital as a real option and treat lockups and notice periods as exercise restrictions. Our methodology incorporates time-varying probabilities of hedge fund failure and optimal early exercise. We estimate a two-year lockup with a three-month notice period costs approximately 1% of the initial investment for an investor with CRRA utility and risk aversion of three. The cost of illiquidity can easily exceed 10% if the hedge fund manager can arbitrarily suspend withdrawals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15937.
Date of creation: Apr 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Andrew Ang & Nicolas P.B. Bollen, 2010. "Locked Up by a Lockup: Valuing Liquidity as a Real Option," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 1069-1096, 09.
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-02 (All new papers)
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- Andrew Ang & Sergiy Gorovyy & Gregory B. van Inwegen, 2011.
"Hedge Fund Leverage,"
NBER Working Papers
16801, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schaub, Nic & Schmid, Markus, 2013. "Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 671-692.
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