Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-Making Systems: Evidence from the American Labor Market
AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between shared capitalist modes of pay and shared modes of decision-making via employee involvement and related committees and between them and measures of productivity and worker well-being in two data sets: the employee based Worker Participation and Representation Survey and the California Establishment Survey. It finds in both data sets that the forms of shared compensation are complementary in the sense that they are more likely to be found together than if firms chose them separately; that shared compensation systems are positively associated with shared decision-making; and that combining shared compensation systems and employee involvement has greater impacts on outcomes than each system by itself.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14272.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Arindrajit Dube & Richard B. Freeman, 2010. "Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-Making Systems: Evidence from the American Labor Market," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 167-199 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-08-31 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-08-31 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2008-08-31 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, 1997.
"How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and Information Technology on Productivity,"
NBER Working Papers
6120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, 2001. "How To Compete: The Impact Of Workplace Practices And Information Technology On Productivity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 434-445, August.
- Lisa M Lynch & Sandra E Black, 2002. "How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and Information Technology on Productivity," Working Papers 02-04, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- S Black & L Lynch, 1997. "How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and Information Technology on Productivity," CEP Discussion Papers dp0376, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1999. "Output-based Pay: Incentives or Sorting?," NBER Working Papers 7419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Peter Cappelli & David Neumark, 2001.
"Do "high-performance" work practices improve establishment-level outcomes?,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 54(4), pages 737-775, July.
- David Neumark & Peter Cappelli, 1999. "Do "High Performance" Work Practices Improve Establishment-Level Outcomes?," NBER Working Papers 7374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1990. "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 255-83, May.
- James A. Brickley & Kathleen T. Hevert, 1991. "Direct Employee Stock Ownership: An Empirical Investigation," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 20(2), Summer.
- Paul Osterman, 1994. "How common is workplace transformation and who adopts it?," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 47(2), pages 173-188, January.
- Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, 1998. "The Last American Shoe Manufacturers: Changing the Method of Pay to Survive Foreign Competition," NBER Working Papers 6750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alex Bryson & Richard Freeman & Claudio Lucifora & Michele Pellizzari & Virginie Perotin, 2012. "Paying for Performance: Incentive Pay Schemes and Employees' Financial Participation," CEP Discussion Papers dp1112, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Carr, Michael D., 2011. "Work hours and wage inequality: Evidence from the 2004 WERS," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 417-427, August.
- Gilberto Tadeu Lima, 2012.
"A Neo‐Kaleckian Model Of Profit Sharing, Capacity Utilization And Economic Growth,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 92-108, 02.
- Gilberto Tadeu Lima, 2011. "A Neo-Kaleckian Model of Profit Sharing, Capacity Utilization and Economic Growth," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2011_05, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.