Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency
Abstract
We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to start and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits associated with being associated with a "winner," the perceptions of stakeholders and potential stakeholders can affect firm value. Our analysis indicates that while transparency (i.e., generating information about a firm's quality) may improve the allocation of resources, a firm may have a higher ex ante value if information about its quality is not prematurely generated. The costs associated with transparency arise because of asymmetric information regarding the extent to which stakeholders benefit from having a relationship with a high quality firm. These costs are higher when firms can initiate non-contractible innovative investments that enhance the value of their stakeholder relationships. Stakeholder effects of transparency are especially important for younger firms with less established track records (e.g., start-ups).Download Info
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13647.Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2007
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Publication status: published as Andres Almazan, Javier Suarez, Sheridan Titman. "Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency," in Thomas Hellman and Scott Stern, editors, "Entrepreneurship: Strategy and Structure" Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 18(3), Fall 2009 (Blackwell Publishing) (2009)
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13647
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Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez & Sheridan Titman, 2007. "Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency," NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship: Strategy and Structure National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez & Sheridan Titman, 2009. "Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 871-900, 09.
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-12-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CSE-2007-12-01 (Economics of Strategic Management)
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