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• John Moore

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 182-186
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:182-186

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.