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Disclosing vs. withholding technology knowledge in a duopoly

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Author Info
Paolo Giorgio GARELLA ()
Emanuele BACCHIEGA ()

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Abstract

We study firms' incentives to transfer knowledge about production technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. In a setting where two technologies are available, a technology is characterized by its associated cost function and no single technology is strictly superior to the other. A firm has superior information if it knows both techniques and the other only one. Cost efficiency may be "reversed" after the voluntary disclosure, so that the rival's costs are improved at the equilibrium level of output. Adding R&D investments to the picture, we find that a firm can decide to invest just for the purpose of acquiring knowledge that will be transferred and not used. Furthermore, for the same point in the parameters space, the acquisition of full knowledge may occur or not as a function of the initial distribution of information

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Paper provided by Department of Economics University of Milan Italy in its series Departemental Working Papers with number 2007-01.

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Date of creation: 14 Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2007-01

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Related research
Keywords: Oligopoly Information disclosure R&D Joint Ventures R&D Consortia Returns to scale

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - General

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    Other versions:
  3. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E. M., 1992. "Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 43-69, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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