Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments
AbstractIn this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as influencing their marginal cost of effort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the first stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", because this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his effort level and probability of winning in a fight. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the first stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economic Studies, University of Dundee in its series Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics with number 243.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
knowledge sharing; strategic knowledge disclosure; multistage contest game; non-cooperative games;
Other versions of this item:
- Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-87, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2010-10-23 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-CTA-2010-10-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2010-10-23 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 255-71, April.
- Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 1999. "A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 253-262, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Andrzej Kwiatkowski).
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