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Endogenous Protection Of R&D Investments

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  • Chrysovalantou Milliou

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Abstract

We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R&D investments from spilling over to competitors. Contrary to most of the existing literature, we show that the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R&D investments. We also show that even if protection is costless, firms sometimes choose to let their R&D investments unprotected. Our welfare analysis indicates that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge should be adopted.

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we066325.

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Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we066325

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Emanuele Bacchiega & Paolo Garella, 2006. "Disclosing vs. Withholding Technology Knowledge in a Duopoly," Working Papers, University of Crete, Department of Economics 0609, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  2. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2012. "Vertical integration, knowledge disclosure and decreasing rival's cost," Economics Working Papers we1213, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  3. Clark, Derek J. & Sand, Jan Yngve, 2009. "Endogenous Technology Sharing in R&D Intensive Industries," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-28, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  4. Ben Youssef, Slim, 2009. "Transboundary Pollution and Absorptive Capacity," MPRA Paper 17158, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Noriaki Matsushima & Koki Arai & Ikuo Ishibashi & Fumio Sensui, 2011. "The effects of non-assertion of patents provisions: R&D incentives in vertical relationships," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 0807, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  6. Ben Youssef, Slim & Zaccour, Georges, 2014. "Absorptive Capacity, R&D Spillovers, Emissions Taxes and R&D Subsidies," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, now publishers, vol. 4(1), pages 41-58, April.

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