International Environmental Cooperation: A New Eye on the Greenhouse Gases Emissions’ Control
AbstractWe examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) modelled as a two-stage non cooperative game. Following Barrett (1994), Finus (2001) and Diamantoudi & al. (2006) and filling out their approach, we analyse the level of cooperation that can be reach when countries’ strategies are complementary. We find that when strategies exhibit weak complementarities, the unique stable agreement can consist of half the countries involved in the negotiation and thus, without any form of commitment, linkage or transfers between countries. These results, established analytically, strongly contrast with those of the previous authors and are a lot more optimistic. Nonetheless, even if the incentives to free-ride are less strong, we do not observe the formation of the “grand” coalition: not all the countries sign the agreement. We also provide some results of comparative static. We analyse, for example, the level of cooperation which only depends on the number of countries concerned with the problem of climate change and on the perception they have of its seriousness.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 09-04.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision: Mar 2009
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2009-03-14 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2009-03-14 (Environmental Economics)
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