Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany) M. Vittoria Levati () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany) Matteo Ploner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany, and University of Trento, Italy)
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The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.
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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek in its series Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics with number
2008-078.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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